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1. INTRODUCTION
Many authors agree that transition is largely a process of institutional change 
(Redek – Susjan 2005; Eicher – Schreiber 2010). Accordingly, institutional eco-
nomics may be particularly relevant in explaining economic differences among 
the 29 transition countries (TCs) we analyse. However, the study of institutions in 
transition is still characterised by empirical gaps that remain to be investigated. 
Most transition studies report that “better institutions” are supportive in achiev-
ing “better economic performance”. However, while results tend to be qualita-
tively similar, model specifications and empirical strategies in this literature are 
diverse. In turn, this reflects a lack of theoretical guidance from the institutional 
literature. Accordingly, the point of departure for this study is the pronounced 
methodological heterogeneity of this literature. Our response is to use the results 
from a meta-regression analysis (MRA) to inform our literature review (Section 
2) from which we derive theoretical and econometric reasons for our model spec-
ification (Section 3). With respect to the substantive issue, we report new findings 
on the timing of institutional effects on economic performance (Section 4). In 
Section 5, we present our conclusions. Because of lack of space, we illustrate the 
results of the modelling in details in our on-line Appendix.  
2. LITERATURE REVIEW
Conventional literature review establishes a general consensus that institutions 
matter for achieving better economic performance in transition. Although the 
qualitative findings seem homogenous, a meta-regression analysis (Efendic et al. 
2011a) applied on institutional studies identified five main sources of heterogene-
ity in this literature: the dependent variable; measurement of the variable of inter-
est that is the proxy variable for institutions; model specification; the estimators 
applied; and the approach to addressing the potential endogeneity of institutions. 
Since these heterogeneities affect estimates of the impact of institutions on eco-
nomic performance, our review will focus on these differences. 
2.1 The dependent variable: output growth or levels?
The core theoretical institutional literature (North 1990) explains the effect of 
institutions on economic performance; hence, not specifying precisely the defini-
tion and measurement of the explained variable. Lack of theoretical precision has 
permitted substantial heterogeneity in empirical studies, which variously focus 
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on economic growth or the level of economic output variables. Efendic et al. 
(2011a) identified 20 studies using output growth and 21 studies using output 
level. This paper reports more robust findings of positive and statistically signifi-
cant institutional effects on output levels than on output growth. Yet, in the tran-
sition sub-sample, research has been mainly focussed on output growth, leaving 
institutional influences on output levels relatively unexplored. 
In addition to the finding that investigating output levels is more likely to 
reveal institutional effects, and that such investigations have been relatively ne-
glected in the transition literature, there are also substantial theoretical reasons 
for focussing on output levels as the dependent variable. Inter alia, Basu (2008) 
and Easterly (2009) argue like this. The main rationale for this modelling strat-
egy is that national differences in per capita output levels reflect entire histories 
of time-varying growth performance. Accordingly, analysing the determinants 
of differing per capita levels helps to avoid non-robust and, hence, spurious ex-
planations that arise from potentially unrepresentative samples of impermanent 
growth processes (reflecting, according to Easterly 2009: 30, “the possibility that 
if you get a result associating high growth with a particular country … in one 
period, it is likely to vanish in the following period.”). Moreover, focusing on per 
capita values enables us to take the relative country size into account (Busse – 
Hefeker 2007). Accordingly, our dependent variable will be defined in terms of 
the per capita output level – the logarithm of GDP per capita (ln gdppc).
2.2 The independent variable of interest: measuring institutional performance 
in transition
Institutions are a “complex” phenomenon and empirical research cannot capture 
all of this complexity; hence, simplified institutional indicators and proxies need 
to be used in applied research (Williamson 2000). A huge disparity in using insti-
tutional proxies in empirical research, without any consensus on the direction of 
“unification”, suggests that a single variable representing institutions is not avail-
able (Keefer – Knack 1997). Consequently, the second methodological challenge 
for empirical research on institutions is to find an “adequate” quantitative proxy 
for the performance/quality/efficiency of institutions in transition. 
Looking at previous transition research, most researchers rely on the European 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) structural and institutional 
change indicators as their proxy for institutions.1 Redek – Susjan (2005), and 
Paakkonen (2009) employ the Heritage Foundation Index of Economic Freedom; 
1 Falcetti et al. 2006; Di Tommaso et al. 2007; Efendic 2010; Eicher – Schreiber 2010.
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Chousa et al. (2005) base their institutional variable on the shadow economy; 
Beck – Laeven (2006) use the World Bank Worldwide Governance indicators, 
while some use specifically designed survey data (e.g. Efendic et al. 2014). 
Most transition papers are based on aggregated institutional indicators. The 
first general critique is that the institutional variable in this case is a broad indica-
tor usually composed of sub-indices, which measure different institutional fea-
tures that might be the product of institutions rather than institutions themselves 
(Shirley 2008). Conversely, De Haan et al. (2006: 182) see this aggregation as an 
advantage of institutional indices; the authors conclude that those indices are both 
“reliable and useful”. 
Another potential shortcoming of these institutional measures is the assump-
tion that the institutional framework among different countries has the same 
structure and size in relation to the economy. Shirely (2008) argues that much 
less effort has been directed towards measuring institutions in specific countries. 
Furthermore, as Havrylyshyn – Van Rooden (2003) underline, such indices are 
based on the judgment of outside experts, which may be subjective and contain 
perceptions bias. Glaeser et al. (2004) argue that potential subjectivity biased 
measures raise doubt over causality that goes from variables representing in-
stitutions to economic growth, since the institutional indices mainly improve 
with the level of economic growth (performance). This is a simple but a rather 
convincing criticism. However, Glaeser et al. (2004) focus on political institu-
tions, while economic along with political institutions, including the interrela-
tionships between them, are crucial for economic prosperity and better perform-
ance (Bjornskov et al. 2010; Sobel – Coyne 2011). Moreover, Sobel – Coyne 
(2011) investigate in particular the issue of the stationarity and cointegration 
of different institutional measures and find that indices of formal political and 
economic institutions are non-stationary, implying that institutional reforms in-
deed have permanent effects. Their finding also implies that, in non-transition 
countries, central parts of the (non-political) institutional framework are very 
persistent over time, suggesting that subjective bias is unlikely to be a main con-
cern.2 All in all, any strategy in measuring institutions in transition will have its 
advantages and disadvantages (Efendic et al. 2011b). However, transition papers 
are rather consistent in using (EBRD) aggregated institutional indices to proxy 
institutional performance. 
2 For this addition we thank an anonymous referee.
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2.3 Model specifi cations in applied transition research
Analysis of the evolution of economic performance in transition is a very com-
plex task, especially because economic theory provides neither clear guidance 
nor consensus as to how the transition process should be analysed (Havrylyshyn 
et al. 2003). In such circumstances, empirical modelling should take into account 
“all” possible determinants and transition specifics, which per se raise a number 
of methodological problems.
There is a wide range of empirical specifications utilised to model institutional 
effects. In some studies, institution(s) is/are the only explanatory variable(s) (of-
ten augmented by the lagged dependent and/or lagged values of the institutional 
variable); for example, Mauro (1995) and Sachs (1996). Although there is no clear 
guideline about the specification that should be used in institutional research, this 
simple “bivariate specification” is less acceptable than a fully-specified model 
(Gwartney et al. 2004). Ostrom (2005) suggests that to understand and analyse 
the processes of structural change of any particular situation, we should include 
one or more of the underlying sets of variables. Adding one or more standard 
growth-determining factors to an institutional bivariate specification leads us to 
some form of the “extended production function specification”, which integrates 
growth factors, institutions, and often some other variables. Such specifications, 
in different forms, can be found in Keefer – Knack (1997), Glaeser et al. (2004), 
Redek – Susjan (2005), and Paakkonen (2009). Finally, we may identify also 
many “other specifications” that include institutions as explanatory variables to-
gether with control variables that are not standard production factors. The semi-
nal paper written by Rodrik et al. (2004) may be a good representative (also 
exploited by Sachs 2003), in which authors use institutions, trade integration, and 
geographical location as explanatory variables of economic development. 
In transition research, there is no consensus concerning the variables to be in-
cluded in these regression models. However, in studies of economic performance 
in transition, extended production function specifications are applied by only a mi-
nority of researchers (e.g. Falcetti et al. 2006; Redek – Susjan 2005), although all 
these transition studies investigate the effect of institutions on economic growth. 
Yet, it is quite the opposite for non-transition research, which includes a good 
number of extended production function specifications and output level studies.
2.4 Estimators used in transition research
Regarding the methodology employed to estimate institutional models, the exist-
ing empirical research on transition is often based on OLS cross-section analy-
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sis, although some research has been based on static panels, while Falcetti et al. 
(2006), Paakkonen (2009) and Eicher – Schreiber (2010), for example, apply a 
dynamic model. We argue below that dynamic panel models are a methodologi-
cal advance in comparison to the cross-section and static panel models applied; 
accordingly, we discuss these papers. 
In their dynamic panel, Eicher – Schreiber (2010) regress GDP per capita 
growth on institutions for a period of 11 years. The institutional variable is con-
structed from the EBRD indicators. The authors find significant evidence that in-
stitutions influence economic growth per capita in transition. Moreover, by ana-
lysing the dynamic contribution of institutions on growth, they find that sustained 
institutional change is crucial for economic performance in transition. However, 
in this research, the standard model diagnostics are not reported, thereby rais-
ing doubts concerning instrument validity, while their bivariate specification may 
give rise to omitted variables bias. A more developed specification is applied by 
Paakkonen (2009) and Falcetti et al. (2006), in which the authors, in addition to 
the (once) lagged dependent variable and an institutional proxy, use other explan-
atory variables such as investment and government consumption, and include the 
interaction of the institutional proxy with some of these variables. These speci-
fications might be considered as more fully specified models. Paakkonen (2009) 
reports a positive effect of increasing economic freedom on economic growth 
over the period 1998–2005. Falcetti et al. (2006) employ the same proxy for in-
stitutions as Eicher – Schreiber (2010) and find that institutions are an important 
determinant of economic growth in transition. 
However, none of these studies report the full range of model diagnostics, as 
recommended by Arrelano – Bond (1991) and they leave some important aspects 
of dynamic panel modelling unexplored. Moreover, the potential effect of time-re-
lated shocks in transition is not investigated; the authors do not include all TCs in 
the sample; and the authors do not investigate the timing of short-run institutional 
effects. All these shortcomings will be addressed in our modelling procedure.  
2.5 Addressing the potential endogeneity of institutional effects on economic 
performance in transition
The problem of the potential endogeneity of institutions is one of the most dif-
ficult in empirical institutional work (Ahlerup et al. 2009). Although institutional 
economists generally recognise institutions as an endogenous factor in econom-
ics, some empirical studies do not consider the potential endogeneity problem 
(in the transition context, this applies to Havrylyshyn – Van Rooden 2003; Re-
dek – Susjan 2005; Chousa et al. 2005). Yet Efendic et al. (2011a) find that the 
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conclusions of such studies should be treated with great caution because of their 
potential overestimation of the institutional effect on economic performance. 
The most widely recognised strategies for addressing the potential endoge-
neity of institutions are those that derive instruments from historical perspectives 
(Acemoglu et al. 2001), the geographical environment (Rodrik et al. 2004), or 
linguistic characteristics (Hall – Jones 1999). Yet these instruments developed for 
global samples typically cannot be applied to sub-samples of countries (Eicher 
– Leukert 2009), in particular to TCs. More promisingly, Falcetti et al. (2006), 
Paakkonen (2009), and Eicher – Schreiber (2010) use internally generated instru-
ments in the context of dynamic panel modelling. Our modelling strategy builds 
upon this approach. 
3. EMPIRICAL MODELLING OF INSTITUTIONAL EFFECTS IN TRANSITION
From our literature review, we conclude that best practice in the investigation of 
institutional effects in transition is to model output levels rather than growth, to 
proxy institutional effects using some established index, to estimate a “fully-spec-
ified” dynamic model, and to address the potential endogeneity of institutions. In 
this section, we explain how our approach responds to these requirements. 
3.1 Institutional proxy
In establishing our proxy variable for institutional quality, we follow the main-
stream transition literature and focus on a broad aggregated indicator of insti-
tutional change, which is constructed from the EBRD indices of structural and 
institutional reforms. In general, this index ranks institutions in transition rela-
tive to the standards of the industrialised market economies. Justification for this 
approach is that transition is in essence a process of transformation from cen-
trally planned towards market oriented economies. Raiser et al. (2001: 6) see the 
EBRD institutional indicators as “the best available data on institutional change 
in transition economies”. Arguably, the EBRD institutional indicators trump all 
other institutional indices that we have identified in the literature for at least two 
reasons. Firstly, institutional reforms in transition include redefining the role of 
the state, market and business sectors, which this index is designed to capture. 
Secondly, observations are available annually from the beginning of transition, 
enabling the longest time-span and the largest number of observations. 
This (unweighted) aggregated institutional EBRD index is scored from 1.0 
(minimum) to 4.3 (maximum); we normalise it to a range from 0 to 1. In our 
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initial checking procedure we found that almost all components of the EBRD 
index are highly correlated with each other, which most researchers also re-
port (Di Tommaso et al. 2007; Eicher – Schreiber 2010; Bjornskov et al. 2010). 
Sobel –Coyne (2011) report that in TCs even minor reforms to one institution can 
be reinforcing and result in subsequent reforms to other institutions, suggest-
ing that institutional changes and reforms are simultaneously and permanently 
maintained . 
Since these sub-indicators may capture similar information coming from dif-
ferent aspects of institutional change, these high correlations are not surprising 
(Di Tommaso et al. 2007: 873). However, the choice of indicators that averaged 
and aggregated to one institutional proxy raises the question of “how to combine 
them in empirical research on institutional change as an underlying process rather 
than focussing on just one sub-dimension” (Raiser et al. 2001: 4). Moreover, 
multicollinearity might be a serious issue in such analysis. Fortunately, Raiser 
et al. (2001) have exploited the Multiple Indicator Multiple Cause methodology 
to control for potential measurement errors in this multidimensional variable, as 
well as for the problem of aggregation of different components of the EBRD in-
dex. The authors find that averaging institutional sub-indices into one composite 
index is an appropriate measure of institutional change in transition. As a check, 
we calculated Cronbach’s Alpha (CA) for the eight components of the EBRD 
index. With complete observations for each index, CA = 0.96, which suggests 
that the aggregation of the EBRD indices is appropriate for the data used in the 
regressions below. 
An additional issue in defining the institutional variable of interest, which has 
not been properly addressed in the literature, is the timing of the institutional 
influence on economic performance. The majority of researchers model contem-
poraneous or short-run institutional effects (Sachs 1996; Redek – Susjan 2005), 
although some authors argue that the institutional influence might work with lags 
(Gwartney et al. 2004; Raiser et al. 2001). Accordingly, the timing of institutional 
effects in transition should be further investigated. To this end, we do not use the 
current and/or lagged values of the proxy for institutions, which is the measure 
typically applied in previous studies. Sobel – Coyne (2011) report that institution-
al proxies, often being non-stationary, should not be used in levels as independ-
ent variables explaining some (non-stationary) measures of economic prosperity. 
Indeed, they should be investigated rather in the form of changes in the series, 
which is the approach that we apply. Accordingly, we use the change in institu-
tional improvement over a five-year period (inst5it), which we characterise as an 
influence over the medium-term. This approach to estimating the influence of 
change in institutions (Sobel – Coyne 2011) over a longer period is recommended 
by Gwartney et al. (2004) and applied, for example, by Raiser et al. (2001). We 
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follow this practice to allow for institutional influences on economic performance 
to take place when sustained over time. In the next section, we advance additional 
econometric reasons for this practice. 
3.2 Base model specifi cation
We specify our base model to estimate the effect of changes in institutional qual-
ity on economic performance within a dynamic framework. We allow current 
economic performance to be influenced by past economic performance. In a dy-
namic panel specification, lagged GDP per capita is an endogenous variable by 
definition. Hence, we control the endogeneity of this variable in its lagged form 
as a regressor by using internal instruments: namely, lagged levels and lagged 
differences. 
To the economic reasons for specifying the institutional variable of interest as 
change in institutional improvement over a five-year period, we add two econo-
metric reasons. Firstly, models in which institutional measures are from the current 
or lagged periods may give rise to spurious regression (Falcetti et al. 2006); con-
versely, our specification – as a stationary variable – should avoid this problem.3 
Secondly, the institutional proxy is constructed in such a way as to eliminate 
reverse causation and from this perspective it may be treated as an exogenous 
variable. It is not likely that current economic performance may explain past 
institutional changes; moreover, using a longer period in measuring institutional 
performance is a good way of attenuating endogeneity (Aron 2000). 
However, in a dynamic panel specification, endogeneity potentially also arises 
from correlation of institutional quality with unobservable time-invariant influ-
ences on economic performance captured by the country-specific error terms (vi). 
Because not all such unobserved variables can be identified (this depends on the 
state of theoretical understanding) or, even if identified, measured (this is sub-
ject to data limitations), we cannot with certainty control for all such potentially 
correlated variables. In this case, endogeneity may arise from omitted variables. 
Accordingly, although we have designed our institutional proxy to be free from 
simultaneity between economic performance and institutional quality as a source 
of endogeneity, we do not assume that inst5it is exogenous. 
3  The Im–Pesaran–Shin panel unit root test confirmed that our dependent variable (lngdppc) is 
a trended variable, integrated of order one (the null that this variable contains a unit root in all 
panels cannot be rejected; p = 1.000), and that our independent variable of interest (inst5) is 
stationary (the null being rejected; p = 0.000). This precludes spurious correlation via common 
statistical generating mechanisms.
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Initial conditions in individual TCs were different. For both economic and 
econometric reasons we control for the potential impact of different starting posi-
tions on later economic performance.4 
Initial conditions proxied by per capita GDP from 1989 cannot be subject to 
endogeneity arising from simultaneity effects. By definition, our initial conditions 
predate the transition period. In addition, correlation between initial conditions 
and unobserved time-invariant influences in the country-specific error terms (vi) 
is unlikely to be sufficiently substantial to give rise to endogeneity bias. Given 
that the purpose of transition was to bring about a profound structural break in 
economic, social and cultural development, we assume the pre-transition time-
invariant components of the country-specific error terms (vi), with which initial 
conditions may have been correlated, to be sufficiently different from the post-
transition components of the vi for correlation between these and the initial condi-
tions not to be a problem in practice. For example, many of the countries giving 
rise to pre-transition country-specific effects no longer exist. For this reason, we 
treat initial conditions as an exogenous variable. We follow some authors and 
include variables commonly used to control for stabilisation policies in transition, 
which may influence economic performance: inflation, budget deficit, domestic 
investment, and foreign direct investment. In our specification, we treat these 
control variables as exogenous.
Over the last 20 years TCs have been going through similar reforms, although 
with different sequences and speeds. Hence, it is possible that those countries 
suffered some universal time-related shocks. Moreover, some TCs experienced 
economic, financial, and political integration or disintegration (particularly the 
countries of former Yugoslavia), which implies possible time-related interde-
pendencies between countries. Hence, we include in our specification time-dum-
my variables in order to control for potential common time-related shocks.
Hence, our model specification has the following form: 
1
ˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆln ln 5 .it it it it t it
it i it
gdppc gdppc inst X Y u
u v
α β λ δ γ
ε
     
 
 (1)
where i = 1, . . . , 29 indexes the TCs and t = 1992, . . . , 2007 indexes the 16 
years in the sample.5 The dependent variable in (1) is the natural logarithm of 
4 See our on-line Appendix 1 to this paper at www.efsa.unsa.ba/adnan.efendic
5  An important issue in any transition research is the observed time period, hence, sample size. 
Some authors, for example Falcetti et al. (2006), estimate their models starting from an earlier 
period of transition (1989), but not with the full sample (3 SEE countries are omitted). The 
supporting argument is that some countries (Central European) made significant progress in 
transition reforms during the initial period (1989–1992). However, the data for this initial 
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GDP per capita denoted as ln gdppcit. ln gdppcit –1 is the dependent variable with 
a one-year lag, while β̂ estimates its effect on the current value of the dependent 
variable. α̂  is the regression intercept; inst5it, the variable of interest, is the differ-
ence in the institutional index over a five-year period where λ̂  measures the effect 
of institutions on the dependent variable. Xit is a 1×k vector of k control variables 
identified as important co-determinants of economic performance in transition, 
which includes domestic investment proxied by the gross capital formation as a 
percentage of GDP (investit), foreign direct investment (FDI) inflow measured 
as a percentage of GDP (fdiperit), budget balance measured as a percentage of 
GDP (budgetit), the inflation rate proxied by the annual rate of change of the con-
sumer price index (cpiit), and, finally, initial conditions proxied by GDP per capita 
(Purchasing Power Parity, income per capita in 1989 US dollars in logarithmic 
form: lh initialit). δ̂  is a k×1 vector of parameters to be estimated. Yt is a vector 
of time dummies to be estimated (t = 1993 . . . 2007). Finally, uit is a composed 
error term, made up of two components: vi, the group-level effects, which control 
for all unobserved influences on countries’ economic performance that can be 
assumed constant (or, at least, slowly moving) over the sample period; and ε̂  the 
observation-specific error term. The strategy of specifying independent variables 
as percentage changes or as ratios to GDP ensures their stationarity and thus 
precludes spurious regression (Redek – Susjan 2005). Further explanation of the 
variables, including data sources, is available in our on-line Appendix 2.6 
Our dynamic model estimates the short-run effect on economic performance 
of the most recent medium-term changes in institutional quality conditional on 
the effects of the entire history of institutional reform under transition. We dem-
onstrate this feature by simplifying our specification, while preserving essentials: 
in equation 2, γit is the level of per capita GDP of country i in year t, Δxit is the 
change in institutional quality in the previous five years, and uit is the usual error 
term. Starting with our simplified specification in equation 2, we repeatedly sub-
stitute for the lagged dependent variable.
Substitute for γit – 1 in (2):
 1ˆ ˆit it it itx uγ λγ β   =  (2)
 1 2 1 1ˆ ˆit it it itx uγ λγ β     =  (3)
period are not reliable and not available for all transition economies. Accordingly, we follow 
the advice of Beck – Laeven (2006) and rely on data from a more stable period of transition 
(1992–2007), which entails the advantage that our model can be estimated for the full sample 
of transition countries (29) with correspondingly more observations (325).
6 www.efsa.unsa.ba/adnan.efendic 
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Substitute (3) into (2)
 2 1 1ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( )it it it it it itx u x uγ λ λγ β β       = . (4)
Substitute for γt – 2 in (4):
 2 3 2 2ˆ ˆit it it itx uγ λγ β     = . (5)
Substitute (5) into (4)
Gather terms
  (6')
… and so on.
By repeated substitution, we demonstrate that dynamic specifications, through 
the lagged dependent variable, contain the entire history of the independent vari-
ables. In equation (6’), we find that current GDP per capita is influenced not only 
by the most recent institutional changes 1ˆ( )itxβ  , but also by the cumulated ef-
fects from institutional changes one period back 1ˆ ˆ( )itxλβ   and two periods back
2
2
ˆ ˆ( )itxλ β  , although these persistence effects attenuate the more remote the pe-
riod (shown by the increasing exponent on λˆ ). Further substitutions demonstrate 
that our dynamic specification includes the whole history of institutional reform 
that influences the current level of per capita GDP. By taking this history into ac-
count, we are able to identify the additional short-run effects on per capita GDP 
of recent – medium-term – institutional changes. In turn, these are informative 
about the process of adjustment of per capita GDP to institutional change. By 
taking account of the effects of all past institutional changes (reforms) together 
with estimating the effect of current adjustment to the most recent change, our 
dynamic model enables the level of per capita GDP to be explained by changes 
in institutional quality, which is consistent with our earlier discussion motivat-
ing the choice of level of per capita GDP as our measure of economic perform-
ance. To anticipate the estimates reported below, because the effects of current 
adjustment do not induce further rounds of effects through time (shown by the 
non-significance of the long-run coefficient on institutional change), the effects 
of institutional change on per capita GDP are fully accounted for by the history of 
institutional change and current adjustment.
3 2 2 1 1
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) .it it it it it it it itx u x u x uγ λ λ λγ β β β              =
3 2 2 2
3 2 1 2 1
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
it it it it it it it itx x x u u uγ λ γ λ β λβ β λ λ            =
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Finally, following good practice guidelines suggested by a number of authors, 
in our on-line Appendix we explain our preference for a dynamic panel model 
estimated by the System General Method of Moments (SGMM), including also 
a discussion of the model diagnostics and how we address potential endogeneity 
in the model (Appendix 3).7 
4. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
The estimated model suggests that per capita GDP was strongly autoregressive in 
the 1992–2007 period. In other words, the main determinant of per capita GDP 
in the current period is per capita GDP in the previous period (LngdppcL1).8 The 
size of the estimated persistence effect (0.913) together with its high level of sta-
tistical significance suggests that the current level of per capita GDP reflects the 
entire history of the process by which it is determined, which includes all previ-
ous institutional developments (Greene 2008: 469).9 Conversely, the estimated 
models reported in Table 1 suggest that the impact of current developments on 
current per capita GDP is limited. However, recent institutional improvement is 
an exception; this does have an effect on current per capita GDP. 
Our variable of interest (inst5) is statistically significant and exerts an econom-
ically substantial influence on economic performance. We estimate a dynamic 
panel model in a Log-Lin form. Hence, a ten percent improvement in institu-
tions over the period of five years is associated, on average, with a 4.03 per-
cent increase in the current GDP per capita level. This implies that as institutions 
improve, increasingly large absolute improvements are needed to yield a given 
increase in GDP per capita. For example, very poor institutions with an index of 
0.1 require an absolute improvement of only 0.01 to give a percentage improve-
ment of 10 per cent, while excellent institutions with an index of 0.9 require an 
absolute improvement of 0.09 – i.e. almost to “perfection” – to give a similar 
percentage improvement. In other words, absolute improvements in institutional 
quality are subject to diminishing returns. Indeed, intuitively, this must be the 
7 www.efsa.unsa.ba/adnan.efendic 
8 Deeper lags of the dependent variable proved to be insignificant.
9  Greene is definitive on this point (2008: 469): “Adding dynamics to a model … creates a ma-
jor change in the interpretation of the equation. Without the lagged variable, the “independent 
variables” represent the full set of information that produce observed outcome yit. With the 
lagged variable, we now have in the equation the entire history of the right-hand-side vari-
ables, so that any measured influence is conditional on this history; in this case, any impact of 
(the independent variables) xit represents the effect of new information.”
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Table 1. Base model – SGMM dynamic panel – two-step robust estimate
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm 
of GDP per capita in current US$ (Lngdppc)
PREFERRED
MODEL:
Inst5 exogenous
ALTERNATIVE 
MODEL:
Inst5 endogenous
variables
(SHORT EXPLANATION OF VARIABLE)
COEFFICIENTS COEFFICIENTS
constant 
(INTERCEPT TERM)
–0.220
(–0.59)
–0.488
(–0.89)
lngdppcL1.
(LAGGED DEPENDENT VARIABLE, 1st LAG)
0.913 ***
(10.88)
0.880 ***
(9.69)
Inst5
(INSTITUTIONS, 5 YEAR DIFFERENCE)
0.403 **
(2.28)
0.438 **
(2.04)
cpi
(INFLATION, ANNUAL AVERAGE IN %)
–0.001
(–0.78)
–0.0001
(–0.59)
budget
(BUDGET DEFICIT, % GDP)
0.001
(0.14)
–0.001
(–0.14)
fdiper
(FDI INFLOW, % GDP)
–0.003
(–1.57)
–0.003
(–1.61)
invest
(DOMESTIC INVESTMENT, % GDP)
0.003
(1.37)
0.003
(1.12)
lninitial
(INITIAL CONDITIONS, GDP PPP 1989)
0.129
(1.10)
0.193
(1.34)
Year dummies for 1996 to 2007: 
_Iyear_1996 –.253 **
(–2.61)
–0.347 **
(–2.31)
_Iyear_1997 –.351 ***
(–3.84)  
–0.380 ***
(–3.56)
_Iyear_1998 –.331 ***
(–3.22)
–0.341 **
(–2.66)
_Iyear_1999 –.420 ***
(–3.90)
–0.435 ***
(–3.78)
_Iyear_2000 –.290 **
(–2.69)
–0.349 ***
(–2.98)
_Iyear_2001 –.225 **
(–2.31)
–0.268 ***
(–2.78)
_Iyear_2002 –.196 **
(–2.15)
–0.216 **
(–2.28)
_Iyear_2003 –.115
(–1.45)
–0.131
(–1.53)
_Iyear_2004 –.087
(–1.45)
–0.109 *
(–1.76)
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Table 1. continued
_Iyear_2005 –.086 **
(–2.13)
–0.111 **
(–2.66)
_Iyear_2006 –.067 **
(–2.51)
–0.089 ***
(–3.22)
Notes: *; **; *** denotes test statistic significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. T-statistics 
(in parentheses) computed from cluster-robust SEs. 
Source: Authors’ calculations using STATA 12.
Model diagnostics
Number of observations 325 325
Number of groups (countries) 29 29
Number of Instruments 41 56
F-test of joint significance:
Ho: The estimated coefficients on the 
independent variables are jointly equal to zero
F (18, 28) = 2,310 
Prob > F = 0.000
F (18, 28) = 2,775 
Prob > F = 0.000
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first 
differences: 
H0: There is no first-order serial correlation 
in residuals
z = –2.67 
Pr > z = 0.008
z = –2.48 
Pr > z = 0.013
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first 
differences:
H0: There is no second-order serial correlation 
in residuals
z = –1.78 
Pr > z = 0.075
z = –1.72 
Pr > z = 0.085
Hansen J-test of overidentifying restrictions (a 
check that the overall model specification is 
valid):
H0: all overidentifying restrictions (all 
overidentified Instruments) are valid 
(exogenous) 
chi2 (22) = 14.44 
Prob > chi2 = 0.885
chi2 (37) = 14.57
Prob > chi2 = 1.000
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of GMM Instrument subsets: 
  
Hansen test excluding the differenced 
Instruments on the levels equation – a test of the 
validity of the Instruments on the differenced 
equation:
H0: Instruments on the differenced equation are 
exogenous (valid)
chi2 (10) = 12.32 
Prob > chi2 = 0.265
chi2 (26) = 10.80
Prob > chi2 = 0.996
Hansen test excluding SGMM Instruments (the 
differenced Instruments on the levels equation); 
in effect, a test of system versus difference 
GMM:
H0: GMM differenced-Instruments on the levels 
equation are exogenous 
chi2 (12) = 2.12 
Prob > chi2 = 0.999
chi2 (11) = 3.77
Prob > chi2 = 0.976
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case; for as institutional quality approaches the ceiling of one, so the potential for 
institutional improvement to raise economic performance is reduced.  
It is instructive to compare the estimated short-run impact effect reported in 
Table 1 and the long-run cumulated impact reported in Table 2. The former is 
statistically significant, whereas the latter is not. This suggests that recent insti-
tutional improvement sustained over the medium term (five years) adds to cur-
rent per capita GDP, but that this is a current impact effect only, hence does not 
cumulate thereafter into a larger long-term effect. After five years, the effects 
of institutional improvement are discernable – in our sample – in a higher level 
of per capita GDP and thus a higher platform for all future economic activity. In 
that sense, the benefits of institutional improvement are long-run (indeed, perma-
nent). However, the combination of a statistically significant short-run (impact) 
coefficient and an insignificant long-run coefficient suggests a once-and-for-all 
economic performance effect from institutional improvement over the medium 
term. In sum, institutional change previously sustained over the medium term 
changes the current level of GDP per capita and thus sets a new starting level for 
the future evolution of GDP per capita.
The coefficient on the lagged dependent variable captures the entire historical 
process, including institutional development, culminating in the current level of 
per capita GDP. The coefficient on the institutional change variable measures the 
Table 1. continued
Hansen test excluding the Instruments on the 
lagged dependent variable:
H0: All other Instruments –Inst5 and the 
exogenous variables – are exogenous (valid) 
Not applicable
chi2 (36) = 16.51
Prob > chi2 = 0.998
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of standard IV Instrument subsets:
Test of the joint validity of all GMM 
Instruments:
H0: GMM Instruments without ”IV” Instruments 
are exogenous 
chi2 (4) = 4.21 
Prob > chi2 = 0.378
chi2 (20) = 14.54 
Prob > chi2 = 0.802
H0: Standard ‘IV’ Instruments are exogenous 
and they increase the Hansen J-test
chi2 (18) = 10.22 
Prob > chi2 = 0.924
chi2 (17) = 0.03 
Prob > chi2 = 1.000
Source: Authors’ calculations using STATA 12.
Table 2. Long-run effect of changes in institutions on economic performance
Variable Long-run coefficient SE t-statistic P>|t|
Inst5 4.64 5.80 0.80 0.431
Source: Authors’ calculations in Stata 12.
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additional impact of recent medium-term changes in institutional quality on cur-
rent GDP. Accordingly, our model encompasses both the effects of institutional 
reform on per capita GDP during the history of transition and the additional ef-
fects of the most recent changes. 
In comparison to some other transition panel models (Redek – Susjan 2005; 
Falcetti et al. 2006; Eicher – Schreiber 2010), in our model the institutional vari-
able in the current or previous period does not appear as significant, suggesting 
that if institutional change does influence economic performance, then it does so 
only when sustained over a longer – but medium-term – period. In other words, 
the time-horizon over which institutions act in transition does matter. Hence, an 
improvement of institutions in transition would not come as a stimulus to eco-
nomic performance overnight. Similar findings are presented by Gwartney et al. 
(2004: 231) in their non-transition research, according to whom a time period of 
5 to 10 years is necessary for the effects of an improvement in the quality of a 
country’s institutions to be registered fully. 
The time-dummy variables used to capture universal time-related shocks in 
transition over the observed period are mainly significant. We do not attempt 
to explain the reasons for such results, since this is not a primary interest. How-
ever, mainly significant time dummies do suggest the presence of time-related 
cross-country shocks – although these may not be specific to transition – which 
otherwise would induce cross-sectional dependence in the residuals. (This is why 
panel models should be specified with time dummies.)
Since the other variables in the model are not our primary interest and are not 
estimated with conventionally acceptable levels of precision, we will just briefly 
comment on them. FDI inflow as a percentage of GDP in per capita terms (fdiper) 
has a negative effect on GDP per capita in the current year, while domestic in-
vestment (invest) proxied by gross fixed capital formation appears as a positive 
influence on GDP. However, if we allow FDI or domestic investment to influ-
ence economic performance with two lags, they appear as significant and positive 
influences on economic performance. In these models, the institutional variable 
remains statistically significant with almost the same magnitude, although the 
model diagnostics substantially worsen (most likely reflecting degrees of free-
dom lost by lagging these variables). Since these variables are not of primary 
interest, we report only the base specification with better model diagnostics. Fi-
nally, better initial conditions (lninitial) in 1989 have a positive sign, suggesting 
an advantage for those TCs with higher GDP per capita in 1989. Our findings on 
the non-significance of budget balance, inflation, and inward FDI are similar to 
those of Redek – Susjan (2005); the finding on FDI inflow is also consistent with 
Carkovic – Levine (2005).
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We conducted a range of robustness checks. These checks investigate the sen-
sitivity of our results to different time-horizons over which recent institutional 
changes influence economic performance, the inclusion of dummy variables for 
EU integration and different groups of TCs, the use of “external” instruments 
for institutional influence, and different endogeneity assumptions, including a 
systematic robustness analysis of the chosen specification implemented through 
a simple variant of extreme abound analysis. Since we are limited with respect to 
space, we report the main findings in our on-line Appendix 4.10 
5. CONCLUSIONS
Our study confirms the economic importance of institutions in post-socialist tran-
sition and adds some new findings. 
Firstly, we find that per capita GDP is determined by the entire history of 
institutional reform and that, conditional on this history, per capita GDP adjusts 
in addition to recent or medium-term institutional changes. Moreover, we find 
that the time-horizon over which we measure institutional performance matters. 
We could identify neither a statistically significant contemporaneous influence of 
improving institutions on economic output, nor a significant effect arising from 
institutional changes measured over periods longer than five years. Instead, we 
were able to identify positive and significant effects most robustly when these 
arose from five-year differences in our measure of institutional quality. This re-
lationship is quite strong: a 10% increase in the quality of institutions over the 
previous five years increases GDP per capita in transition countries by 4%, on av-
erage. We also find that absolute improvements in institutional quality are subject 
to diminishing returns. As institutional quality approaches the ceiling of index 
equal to one, so the potential for institutional improvement to raise economic 
performance is reduced. 
Our model takes into account the long term. Our estimated institutional effects 
are conditional on the entire history of institutional improvement (and, indeed, of 
all of the independent variables). However, we find that the response of economic 
performance to institutional improvement is a medium-term effect. Institutional 
change previously sustained over the medium term changes the current level of 
GDP per capita and thus sets a new starting level for the future evolution of GDP 
per capita. Moreover, this institutional effect is realised once and for all, because 
it does not cumulate into a larger effect over time. In sum, our model estimates 
the current effect of recent medium-term institutional improvement on economic 
10 www.efsa.unsa.ba/adnan.efendic 
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performance over and above the effects of the previous history of institutional 
improvement. 
Secondly, our findings suggest that the 29 transition countries as a whole suf-
fered from universal time related shocks captured by period (year) dummy vari-
ables. An implication of this finding is that models omitting period dummies are 
misspecified. 
We set out some features of good practice in the study of institutional effects 
on economic performance. We advanced three ways to increase the validity of 
reported results: (1) in the absence of precise guidance from institutional theory 
on model specification, we consult meta-analysis of the literature for guidance 
on the implications of competing specification choices; (2) we endorse dynamic 
panel modelling as the preferred approach to identifying institutional effects on 
economic performance, and a SGMM approach to estimation, while insisting 
more than previous studies do on the importance of model diagnostic tests and 
checks; and (3) a further corollary of lack of guidance from theory on model 
specification is the requirement to conduct systematic checking of the robustness 
of reported results by comparison with results from competing specifications, to 
which end we propose a variant of extreme bounds analysis designed to check 
the robustness of dynamic panel estimates. (These features of good practice are 
all reported and discussed in the on-line Appendix 4 accompanying this article: 
www.efsa.unsa.ba/adnan.efendic.)  
Finally, from the perspective of political decision-makers, the preferred re-
sults are probably not very “encouraging”, because the effects of institutional 
improvement appear to work over longer time-horizons than the typical electoral 
cycle. This may point to an inconsistency between policy-makers’ short-run pri-
orities and sound policies for the medium and/or long run. This adds to the better 
understanding of lagging institutional reforms and improvements in some TCs, 
and so may help to inform potential strategies for maintaining and/or renewing 
impetus to institutional reform. 
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